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The significance of legitimate expectations for climate justice
May we pursue our life plans?
For the purpose of our project, we make the following normative assumptions in ideal theory. First, a justifiable
global quota of emissions can be determined by relying on con-
siderations of intergenerational justice, among others (Meyer
2009). Second, in determining a just distribution of the still per-
missible emissions we should be concerned about distributing
the per capita benefits of engaging in emission-generating 
activities by distributing tradable emission rights and further,
by distributing these over the whole lifespan of individuals
(Meyer/Roser 2006). Third, liberal egalitarian and non-egalita-
rian principles of distributive justice (and in particular, the so-
called priority view) will demand at least equal per capita emis-
sion rights for all individuals and over their whole lifespan
(Meyer/Roser 2006).
The individual level of emissions
Next we assume, uncontroversially, in our opinion, that the
level at which people in the highly developed countries (to whom
we will refer as Pn) in fact cause emissions today and expect to
be able to cause emissions in living their lifes is above the just
per capita level of emissions. They have formed certain expec-
tations under a background condition of injustice, and at least
some of those expectations are significant, in that they have a
substantial impact on life plans and long-term projects.
Our project aims to explore the normative implications of
that fact. In particular, we propose distinguishing between two
important questions, both of which we attempt to answer. The
first concerns the legitimacy of the expectation that Pn will be
able to emit at a certain level now and in the future. Let us call
this Expectation E. That word, ‘legitimacy,’ is capable of bearing
a wide variety of meanings, but we mean something reasonab-
ly precise by it here, namely the following: We will call an expec-
tation formed under conditions of injustice legitimate if the
agent with the expectation cannot be blamed for having it. We
attempt to outline the conditions that need to be satisfied for the
expectations of Pn regarding current and future levels of emis-
sions to be considered legitimate in our sense, and we then ex-
plore whether any of those expectations actually satisfy our out-
lined conditions.
Having suggested a way of distinguishing between legitimate
and illegitimate expectations, our second question in essence
asks: well, so what? That is to say, whether or not expectations
about the level of emissions that will obtain now and in the 
future in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development countries are legitimate (in our sense of the term).
Do these have any normative significance (beyond the fact that
agents cannot be blamed for having those legitimate expecta-
tions), and if so, what? And further, does that significance 
depend on whether or not those expectations are legitimate or
not?
We will consider an expectation to have normative signi-
ficance when the answer to any of the following questions is yes:
❚ Do these expectations modify what we think a just distribu-
tion of emission rights is?
❚ Do these expectations generate rights for the people who
have them?
❚ Do these expectations modify how the burdens of transitio-
nal justice, i.e. in this context the costs associated with mo-
ving from an unjust distribution of emission rights to a just
one, should be distributed?
In this short report we will outline the current state of our
project with respect to the first question, that of the legitimacy
of expectations.
Legitimate Expectations
A working hypothesis of our project is that there are four con-
ditions, each individually sufficient, for an expectation to be le-
gitimate in the sense in which we are using that term.
❚ The first is called the Epistemic Condition, and it states: One
cannot be blamed for forming Expectation E, if one could not
have been reasonably expected to know that level X is above
the just per capita level.
❚ The second can be called the Morality Condition, and it sta-
tes: One cannot be blamed for forming expectation E, if the-
re is reasonable disagreement over whether level X is in fact
above the just per capita level.
❚ The third can be called the Possibility Condition, and it sta-
tes: One cannot be blamed for forming Expectation E, if all
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include a level of mitigation, that renders level X an unjust per
capita level.
The possibility condition absolves the agent of blame for ha-
ving the expectation of being able to continue to emit X if no
possible alternative expectations that were morally better could
have been formed. Now, if a single agent in the North decided
to emit below X, at a level consistent with a just level of per ca-
pita emissions, this would on its own make (very close to) no
difference to climate change. That is to say, looked at in terms
of consequences, the agent does not seem to have any relevant
morally better alternative to continuing to emit X – any level of
emissions she chooses is going to have the same impact, i.e.
close to none, on climate change. Further, and here we come to
the cost condition, this decision would be extremely expensive,
involving as it most likely would a radical departure from 
current ways of life in the North.
In the first instance, however, we propose distinguishing bet-
ween the legitimacy of a way of life and the legitimacy of the ex-
pectation that one will continue to be able to live in a particular
way. It may well be true that there is no realistic possibility of li-
ving a life that is morally better than the type of life associated
with emitting X and / or that the costs associated with living a
morally better life are too high to be able to expect anyone to live
that life. However, the distinction between ways of life and ex-
pectations means we need to investigate whether there is a way
to link the possibility / expensiveness of changing one’s way of
life to the possibility / expensiveness of changing one’s expec-
tations.
Changing the way of life
A working hypothesis of our project is that there is such a
link because ways of life, properly understood, include long-term
projects; and expectations are relevant to choosing between long-
term projects and deciding which to pursue. The general point
is that one makes significant choices based on the expectations
one has formed, and if one changes one’s expectations, one
might well make different choices. This generates the next wor-
king hypothesis, which is that the possibility and cost conditions
can be satisfied in the case of Expectation E.
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other possible expectations that could have been formed were
no better, morally speaking, than the expectation that one 
would be continued to allow to emit at level X. 
❚ The fourth can be called the Cost Condition, and it states:
One cannot be blamed for forming expectation E, if it was
extremely expensive to form a different expectation.
It is important to reiterate two things. Firstly, these are hypo-
theses of the project; our conclusions may or may not confirm
them. Secondly, our hypothesis is that these conditions should
all be considered as each being individually sufficient to ab-
solve the agent from blame for having formed the expectation
that they would continue to be allowed to emit at level X.
Our Expectations about Emissions
We have, then, four relevant conditions for judging whether
an agent can or cannot be blamed for having formed an expec-
tation about how much she will be allowed to emit now and in
the future – the Epistemic, Morality, Possibility and Cost condi-
tions respectively. If any of those four conditions are satisfied,
then we can call the expectation in question legitimate. The
question for us now is whether, broadly speaking, the expecta-
tions formed by Pn about the current and future level of their
emissions are indeed legitimate.
The working hypotheses of our project with regard to this
question are as follows.
Firstly, the epistemic condition: Our working hypothesis here
is that Expectation E does not satisfy this condition, firstly be-
cause Pn could by now be reasonably expected to know that le-
vel X is above the just per capita level, and secondly because the
following appeal from the problem of uncertainty does not seem
to succeed.
That appeal consists of claiming first that agents simply do
not know what the just level of per capita emissions is going to
be, and then arguing that therefore they cannot be expected to
know that level X is unjust. This appeal is problematic because
the conclusion does not seem to follow – we do not need to
know what the just level of per capita emissions is to know that
level X is unjust; all we need to know is that whatever the just
level of per capita emissions, level X is above it.
As regards the morality condition, the project proposes in-
vestigating two possible grounds for thinking it is satisfied in
the case of Expectation E. The first is reasonable disagreement
over whether emissions, looked at in isolation, are the appropri-
ate focus of principles of distributive justice. Our working hy-
pothesis here is that even if one thinks they are not, the strong
correlation between emissions and all plausible candidates for
baskets of goods that are appropriate foci for principles of dis-
tributive justice means that level X will be above the just per ca-
pita level of emissions. The second possible ground is reasona-
ble disagreement over whether mitigation or adaptation is the
best way to respond to climate change. Our working hypothesis
here is that this does not lead to the morality condition being
satisfied because all plausible adaptation strategies are likely to ,
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The possibility and cost conditions may therefore legitimate
Expectation E. A final set of hypotheses of our project concerns
an important qualification to that claim.
The first in that set is the hypothesis that the eventual solu-
tion, whatever it is, will have to be (a) collective in the sense that
everyone will have to emit less than X and (b) authoritatively im-
posed, in order to ensure that everyone does actually emit less
than X.
The second hypothesis in that set is that we can say that Pn
know, or at any rate can be reasonably expected to know, that the
eventual collective solution will mean only being able to emit at
a level much below X.
So the concluding hypothesis, which is the important quali-
fication referred to earlier, is that Pn’s expectation of continuing
to be allowed to emit at level X is legitimate until a collective so-
lution is authoritatively imposed, because until that happens it
is impossible / too expensive to live a morally better life in terms
of how much one emits. However, it is not legitimate to expect
to continue to be allowed to emit at level X after such a solution
is in place.
To sum up: the epistemic condition does not seem to be sa-
tisfied in the case of the expectation people in the North have
that they can continue to emit at level X into the future. The mo-
rality condition might however, in some circumstances, legiti-
mate that expectation (i.e. it can absolve the agent of blame for
having it), but our hypothesis is that this is unlikely. Finally, the
possibility and cost conditions can legitimate Expectation E cur-
rently, but cannot legitimate it once an authoritatively imposed
collective solution is in place.
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